Zhuo Rongtai Criticizes Vice-Presidential Checks on President, Highlights Semi-Presidential Power Imbalance

Recently, discussions surrounding Taiwan's constitutional system and the separation of powers have heated up again, triggered by legal scholars proposing the view that the counter-signature power of the Premier should be used to "check the President." In response, Premier Cho Jung-tai clearly addressed the matter in the Legislative Yuan and at related public events, stating bluntly that a deep enough understanding of Taiwan's current constitutional system and spirit reveals blind spots in the practical application of such a view. Cho emphasized that, under the current constitutional framework, the Premier is directly appointed by the President. If a situation arises where the President insists that a certain bill must be counter-signed while the Premier firmly disagrees, the President can simply replace the Premier with a candidate willing to comply and provide the counter-signature. This remark not only highlights the practical plight of the executive head under the current system, but also once again touches upon the core controversy of power distribution in Taiwan's "semi-presidential system," which has blended the spirits of the presidential and parliamentary systems since constitutional amendments were enacted.

To understand this debate over the power of counter-signature, one must review the context of Taiwan's constitutional development. The Additional Articles of the Constitution established the current central government system, where the President holds the status of head of state and the power to appoint the head of the executive branch, while the Executive Yuan serves as the highest administrative organ responsible to the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, the Premier is required by law to counter-sign laws promulgated and orders issued by the President. For a long time, the legal community has held differing views on the nature of the counter-signature power. Some scholars believe that the power of counter-signature is not merely a formal signature of endorsement, but also carries functions of substantive review and the sharing of political responsibility—meaning the Premier can express disagreement with policies by refusing to counter-signature, thereby forming a braking mechanism against presidential power. However, opposing practitioners and constitutional scholars point out that Taiwan's constitutional design is not a pure parliamentary system, and the power to appoint and dismiss the Premier rests entirely in the hands of the President. This asymmetry in personnel authority makes it difficult for the counter-signature power to exert a substantive checking effect when faced with the President's will.

Premier Cho's recent stance is precisely based on this cold reality of practical operation. He further explained that when irreconcilable differences arise between the President and the Premier on major policies or bills, because the Premier is appointed by the President and the President holds absolute dominance over personnel, if the Premier insists on exercising the counter-signature power to resist, the most direct result is often not the President's compromise, but the dismissal of the Premier. The possibility of "replacing the person to get the counter-signature" greatly diminishes the theoretical checking function of the counter-signature power, and may even reduce it to a mere formality. Cho's remarks are not only a response to the academic discussions of scholars, but also a pragmatic description of the current power structure, highlighting the political reality that, under the existing constitutional framework, the Premier leans heavily toward the role of the President's chief of staff.

Beyond the institutional perspective, this controversy is closely linked to the current political interactions between the Legislative Yuan and the executive department. During his response, Cho specifically emphasized that for bills that have already expired or controversial statutory clauses, the executive department cannot possibly engage in a so-called "re-counter-signature." Behind this statement lies the recent legal offense and defense between the ruling and opposition parties regarding bills, vetoes, promulgations, and implementation deadlines. After the Legislative Yuan passes specific controversial bills through three readings, fierce conflicts often arise between the executive and legislative branches over the constitutionality and legitimacy of the bills, as well as subsequent execution procedures. To a certain extent, scholars proposing the theory of checks via counter-signature hope that the Executive Yuan can play a stronger defensive line. However, considering constitutional realities and the political situation, the executive head believes that relying solely on the counter-signature power to oppose resolutions from the President or the Legislative Yuan is not only legally difficult to implement, but also lacks operational space politically.

This constitutional debate, sparked by scholarly remarks and addressed directly by the Premier, reflects Taiwan's continuous exploration and reflection over decades of democratization regarding the separation of powers and checks and balances mechanisms. Viewed from the history of constitutional amendments, Taiwan's central government system integrates elements such as the popularly elected presidential power of a presidential system, along with the Premier's counter-signature and accountability to the parliament from a cabinet system. The operation of this "dual-executive system" or "semi-presidential system" relies heavily on mutual understanding and the balance of power within the ruling team. When the political situation between the ruling and opposition parties is tense and the relationship among the presidential office, the Executive Yuan, and the legislature is volatile and unpredictable, the constitutional provisions concerning the intersection of powers are examined under a microscope. Cho Jung-tai's outspokenness not only clarifies the boundaries and limits of the counter-signature power under the current system, but also prompts the general public to once again confront the structural characteristics and practical limitations of Taiwan's constitutional system in power distribution.