Zhuo Rongtai Rejects Co‑signature, Sparks Outcry; Blue Camp Decries Constitutional Rewrite

Premier Zhuo Rongtai recently commented on the constitutional controversy surrounding a bill passed by the Legislative Yuan, noting that under the current constitutional framework the President lacks a direct veto power over legislation. He argued that when the Legislative Yuan passes a bill that may be unconstitutional, the Premier, as head of the Executive Yuan, must employ a refusal to counter‑sign as a means to support and defend constitutional order. The statement immediately triggered a wave of political backlash, drawing intense attention and strong displeasure from opposition parties.

In response to Premier Zhuo’s “no counter‑sign” stance, the Kuomintang (KMT) swiftly held a press conference to denounce the remarks, accusing the Premier of openly rewriting the Constitution of the Republic of China. The KMT pointed out that the Constitution explicitly provides a comprehensive reconsideration system: when the Executive Yuan believes that a decision adopted by the Legislative Yuan is obstructive or impractical, it can return the decision to the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration, a legal remedy and brake mechanism granted to the executive branch. Premier Zhuo, however, dismissed the existing reconsideration system and even invented a concept of presidential veto that does not exist in the Constitution. The KMT said that such a claim is not only logically incoherent but also constitutes a serious assault on the democratic constitutional system.

At the heart of this dispute lies the relationship between the amended constitutional provisions and the main text regarding the interaction between executive and legislative powers. According to the current Constitution, bills, budgets, and amnesty measures passed by the Legislative Yuan must be transmitted to the President and the Executive Yuan; the President is required to promulgate them within ten days of receipt. If the Executive Yuan finds the decision obstructive or impractical, it may, with the President’s approval, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider. This reconsideration mechanism is the proper legal procedure for the Executive Yuan to counterbalance an expansion of legislative power or policy conflict. At the same time, the Constitution also stipulates that the Premier must counter‑sign presidential orders, a duty that carries significant political responsibility. Historically, the Premier has rarely used a refusal to counter‑sign as a routine means of opposing the Legislative Yuan.

Premier Zhuo’s proposal to refuse counter‑signing reflects the current severe polarization between the ruling and opposition camps. With the KMT and the People’s Party holding a majority in a Legislative Yuan where no single party has an outright majority, several policies and bills promoted by the Executive Yuan have repeatedly encountered resistance. The clash between the executive and legislative branches has already heated up on major issues such as Legislative Yuan reform. Faced with bills passed by opposition coalitions, the executive branch has not only resorted to reconsideration and constitutional petitions but has also sought additional constitutional interpretations outside the existing framework. The “no counter‑sign” concept, to some extent, represents the executive team’s last line of defense against the