RSF and SPLM‑N seize Blue Nile’s Bakori and Sulkum bases

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced on the 28th of this month that, in partnership with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement‑North (SPLM‑N), they had seized the military bases at Bakori and Surkum in the southeastern part of Blue Nile State, and claimed control of the main roads and communications infrastructure in the area. The move comes amid long‑standing instability in the region and has drawn heightened attention from the Khartoum government and the international community.

The RSF traces its origins to the early 2000s Janjaweed militias and was formally incorporated into the national security apparatus in 2013, becoming a semi‑regular paramilitary force attached to the government army. After the military coup of April 2023, a power struggle between the RSF and the Transitional Military Council (TMC) escalated into a nationwide armed conflict, with fighting persisting in the capital and across multiple provinces. The RSF is known for its rapid mobility, heavy equipment and air support, and in recent years has expanded operations along the eastern and southern borders, seeking to force the government to concede by occupying key points.

The SPLM‑N, which split from the original Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) following South Sudan’s independence in 2011, is an armed political party primarily active in Blue Nile and Karmal states. Its political agenda focuses on local autonomy, resource allocation and ethnic rights, alternating between guerrilla warfare and negotiations. In recent months, the SPLM‑N and the RSF have found common cause in Blue Nile, both opposing Khartoum’s military pressure and seeking control over the region’s agricultural and mineral resources.

The Bakori and Surkum bases sit at a transport hub in Blue Nile State, linking the main road network between Ethiopia and Sudan’s interior and lying close to the state’s oil‑gas exploration zone. Military analysts note that the RSF’s capture of the two sites not only enhances its force‑projection capability in the southeast but could also sever government supply lines, pressuring Khartoum to make concessions at the negotiating table. Internationally, the United Nations and the African Union have called on both sides to exercise restraint, warning that an escalation could spill over into neighboring countries and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and refugee flows in the region.

For Taiwan, the conflict in Sudan’s southeast, while not directly linked to domestic security, has implications for global energy and agricultural supply chains. Blue Nile’s oil‑gas resources and agricultural exports hold a modest share of international markets; a deterioration of the situation could push up crude‑oil and food prices, thereby increasing Taiwan’s import costs and inflationary pressures. Moreover, heightened instability in Sudan could generate additional refugee movements through the Red Sea corridor toward the Middle East and Europe, indirectly affecting Taiwan’s role and resource allocation in international humanitarian assistance and diplomatic mediation.