Iran Sets Seven Conditions for US Ceasefire Talks, Rezaee Announces

Mohsen Rezaee, the newly appointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), announced on 28 August 2026 that Tehran has laid out seven conditions for resuming ceasefire negotiations with the United States. The statement was made during a press briefing in Tehran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Rezaee emphasized that the conditions were “essential prerequisites for any constructive dialogue.” The U.S. has yet to respond formally, but Washington’s diplomatic corps is reportedly reviewing the list in light of recent developments in the Middle East.

The SNSC, established under the 1989 constitutional revision, serves as the apex body for coordinating Iran’s national security policy and safeguarding the Islamic Republic’s sovereignty. The council’s secretary is a presidential appointee, a role that has seen rapid turnover in recent months. After the assassination of Ali Larijani in March 2026, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr briefly held the post before being succeeded by Rezaee in early August. Rezaee’s appointment follows a period of heightened diplomatic activity as Iran seeks to re‑engage with the international community following years of economic isolation and stalled nuclear negotiations.

The ceasefire agenda is part of a broader effort to de‑escalate tensions that have escalated in the past year, particularly following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the re‑imposition of sanctions on Iranian nuclear facilities. Tehran’s conditions reportedly include the U.S. lifting or easing key sanctions, a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology, the release of Iranian political prisoners held abroad, assurances against future unilateral military actions in the region, a cessation of support for proxy militias, a transparent mechanism for monitoring nuclear enrichment levels, and a framework for a phased return to the JCPOA. While the U.S. has expressed a willingness to revisit the nuclear agreement, it has maintained that any talks must first address Iran’s compliance with non‑proliferation commitments and the broader security concerns of its allies in the Gulf.

The U.S. perspective remains cautious. Washington’s State Department has reiterated that it will not engage in negotiations until Iran meets its non‑proliferation obligations and that the U.S. will continue to monitor Iran’s regional activities, particularly its involvement in Yemen and the support for various non‑state actors. The United Nations Security Council and the European Union are also monitoring the situation, with several member states calling for a renewed diplomatic framework that includes all stakeholders. Iran’s insistence on lifting sanctions is seen by some analysts as a strategic lever, while others warn that it could be used to delay substantive negotiations.

For the wider region, the outcome of these talks will shape the security calculus of Gulf Cooperation Council states, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, all of whom view Iran’s nuclear program and proxy activities as key threats. A breakthrough could reduce the likelihood of proxy conflicts and ease economic sanctions that have disrupted oil markets and regional trade. For global supply chains, especially in the semiconductor sector, a de‑escalation would remove a significant source of uncertainty that has forced companies to diversify their sourcing away from Iranian technology suppliers. Even Taiwan, a major player in advanced chip manufacturing, stands to benefit indirectly: a more stable Middle East would likely translate into steadier energy prices and reduced risk of supply chain disruptions for critical raw materials. Moreover, a U.S. pivot away from a confrontational stance toward Iran could free diplomatic and economic bandwidth for addressing cross‑Pacific security concerns, thereby indirectly influencing Taiwan’s strategic environment.