Lawmaker Demands Taipower Investigation Into Third Nuclear Plant Fire Delay

The Third Nuclear Power Plant operated by Taipower, located in Pingtung County, experienced a fire today at the resource recycling and sorting facility within the plant grounds. Although the fire was swiftly extinguished by firefighting units without causing any radioactive material leaks or casualties, the time gap in reporting the incident immediately triggered high concern and skepticism from local public opinion. Legislator Hsu Fu-kuei responded immediately after the incident, demanding that the competent authorities conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the entire event and release a detailed, complete timeline of the accident to clarify whether there were any delays or negligence in the reporting procedures and response mechanisms.

According to the notification reception and on-site handling records of the firefighting units, the fire occurred at the resource recycling and sorting facility within the Third Nuclear Power Plant. This area is primarily used for the temporary storage and classification of various recyclable materials and wastes generated during daily plant operations, and does not belong to the core nuclear power generation area or radioactive waste treatment facilities. However, due to the special sensitivity inherent to nuclear power plants, any unexpected safety accidents within the plant inevitably touch the nerve of surrounding residents regarding public safety. After the fire broke out, it was reported that there was a time gap of approximately 24 minutes between the communication of the plant's self-defense firefighting organization and the local fire department, a figure that has become the most debated focal point of this incident.

Regarding the concerns raised by the reporting time gap, Legislator Hsu Fu-kuei put forward four specific demands, emphasizing that the lives and property safety of Pingtung residents must never be subject to any chance or negligence. First, he demanded that Taipower and relevant units thoroughly investigate the exact cause of the fire at the resource sorting facility; whether it was due to electrical factors, human error, or other external conditions, scientific appraisal must be conducted to clarify the truth. Second, regarding the gap between the plant's internal notification mechanism and the external firefighting unit's receipt of the report, a complete timeline and reporting record must be made public to clearly explain the situation to the general public. Furthermore, the Third Nuclear Power Plant must comprehensively review and strengthen the fire safety protection network for all non-nuclear safety areas within the plant. Finally, a more transparent and timely reporting and information disclosure mechanism should be established so that local governments and residents can grasp the situation at the first instance, thereby eliminating unnecessary panic.

In recent years, as the Third Nuclear Power Plant gradually faces decommissioning schedules and the advancement of related energy transition policies, the plant's safety management and decommissioning preparations have consistently been under high scrutiny from all sectors of society. The operational safety of a nuclear power plant goes beyond core control; routine plant fire safety, waste management, facility maintenance, and crisis response capabilities are all indispensable components constituting the overall nuclear safety defense line. Although the fire at the resource sorting facility was controlled in scale and did not cause major disaster, it essentially reflects whether the grassroots reporting chain and response efficiency of large industrial facilities can withstand rigorous testing when facing sudden accidents, which is crucial for maintaining the trust of surrounding residents.

From the perspective of overall public governance and risk management, the Pingtung area where the Third Nuclear Power Plant is located has long borne the infrastructure for national energy policies, and the local society's demand for safety standards naturally possesses a high degree of legitimacy. The active intervention of elected representatives and local government after the incident is not intended to deliberately create panic, but rather stems from their supervisory duty to demand that state-owned enterprises treat every safety detail with the highest standards. Only through a public and transparent investigation report, an honest review of the causes behind the delay in reporting procedures, and the fulfillment of various improvement commitments can public confidence in the safety of the nuclear power plant area be truly rebuilt or consolidated, ensuring the stability and sustainable development of the local community.