Han Kuo-yu Criticizes Executive Yuan's Weaponization of Deputy Signature Power; Only 3% Impact

Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu recently questioned the Executive Yuan's exercise of the right of refusal to countersign bills, publicly criticizing the Executive Yuan for "weaponizing" this constitutional power. He argued that this not only misinterprets the normative intent originally vested in the system by the Constitution, but also raises concerns regarding Taiwan's current constitutional operations. Faced with the harsh criticisms from the Legislative Yuan President and the escalating confrontational atmosphere, the Executive Yuan responded promptly, emphasizing that the right of countersignature is not a weapon for active attack, but rather an indispensable "shield" granted by the Constitution to protect the overall constitutional order. Through specific data, the Executive Yuan demonstrated that the executive branch has consistently maintained a high degree of prudence and respect when handling bills passed through three readings by the legislature, and that there has been no abuse of power.

According to specific statistical data provided by the Executive Yuan, since the deliberation and promulgation of relevant controversial bills in the current session up to the end of August this year, the Executive Yuan has completed countersignatures for as many as 201 bills passed through three readings by the Legislative Yuan. Out of this large volume of passed legislation, the Executive Yuan decided not to countersign only 8 bills, accounting for a proportion of approximately 3.8 percent. The Executive Yuan used this data to forcefully refute external accusations of "abusing the right of refusal to countersign," emphasizing that this 3.8 percent figure fully demonstrates that when facing controversial bills, the Executive Yuan adopts an extremely restrained and passive defensive stance, rather than actively provoking constitutional conflicts between the Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan, or between the executive and legislative branches.

From the perspective of Taiwan's current constitutional system and Additional Articles, the Premier of the Executive Yuan is legally required to countersign bills passed through three readings by the Legislative Yuan and forwarded to the President for promulgation. This system stems from the design of responsible politics, allowing the head of the executive branch to bear ultimate political responsibility for bills passed by the legislature. However, when a bill involves obvious unconstitutionality, severe implementation difficulties, or causes a serious impact on the national constitutional system and the principle of separation of powers, the right of countersignature and the right of reconsideration are often viewed as important mechanisms for the executive branch to balance the expansion of power by a legislative majority. Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu's concern that the right of refusal to countersign might be expanded without limit reflects the legislature's strong wariness that its power of legislation through three readings could be substantially blocked by executive power. This also highlights the serious cognitive gap between the ruling and opposition parties regarding the boundaries of constitutional power in the current political climate.

This remote confrontation between the Legislative Yuan President and the Executive Yuan is not merely a debate over a single bill or specific figures; more fundamentally, it touches upon the profound contradictions in executive-legislative relations under Taiwan's dual democratic system following democratization. When the legislative majority and executive power are held by different political parties or political camps, the legislative branch actively promotes bills, while the executive branch holds defensive constitutional tools such as reconsideration and the refusal to countersign. In the process of power competition, both sides easily transform checks and balances within constitutional procedures into political polemics. Standing from the perspective of the head of the legislature, Han Kuo-yu must defend the dignity of the parliament and the legislative validity of bills passed through three readings; meanwhile, the Executive Yuan must firmly guard the executive autonomy and rule of law defense lines conferred by the Constitution. The actions and statements of both sides command widespread attention and affect the stability of the central government's subsequent operations.

From the perspective of long-term political development and democratic maturity, the controversy between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan over the right of refusal to countersign ultimately requires solutions through judicial interpretation by the Constitutional Court or rational negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties. The maintenance of constitutional order requires the executive and legislative branches to check and balance one another on the basis of the separation of powers, while also demanding mutual respect. If both sides continue to interpret various constitutional powers as weapons of attack or defense, it will not only hinder the promotion of major national policies and the implementation of people's livelihood bills, but may also erode public trust in the democratic system. The Executive Yuan's release of the 3.8 percent figure this time is an attempt to gain the understanding of rational voters in the public opinion war, and Han Kuo-yu's public concerns also serve as a reminder that the ruling team must face up to the representativeness of parliamentary public opinion. How to grasp the proper boundaries in the operation of power will be a crucial test for whether Taiwan's democracy can continue to advance steadily.