Experts warn democracies must deepen defense resilience and reduce internal divisions against Sino-Russian threats.

As authoritarian nations such as mainland China and Russia increasingly employ diversified warfare tactics across military, cyber, and intelligence domains, the security risks faced by democracies are growing more complex. In recent years, Russia's military operations in Ukraine and China's military drills in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have demonstrated that these countries, beyond traditional military might, are adept at utilizing intelligence, cyber, and psychological tactics to undermine their adversaries' domestic cohesion and international support. In response, numerous international security scholars have begun calling for a shift, arguing that mere investment in military hardware is no longer sufficient to fend off novel threats, and that more flexible and resilient defense systems must be established to maintain the advantage in a constantly changing battlefield environment.

In an exclusive interview with CNA, Christopher Walker, the originator of the "sharp power" concept and Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), pointed out that if democratic societies wish to enhance their defense resilience, their primary task is to deepen defense and national security systems while reducing internal division and polarization. Walker emphasized that defense resilience encompasses far more than just military equipment and tactical dimensions; it also covers multi-dimensional aspects such as information security, social governance, and public trust. As Vice President of CEPA, he has long focused on the roles of the U.S. and Europe on the global security stage, drawing upon this background to propose "defense resilience" as the core concept for democracies facing the challenges of authoritarianism.

Internal division is regarded as a vulnerable link in democratic societies. In recent years, information filter bubbles and polarization trends on social media have made consensus among various political and social groups increasingly scarce. Walker noted that if democracies fail to form a shared security awareness and collaborative mechanisms domestically, external forces can exploit societal contradictions and spread misinformation to further erode the nation's overall defense efficacy. Therefore, he suggested that countries should reduce internal antagonism and build a more robust national defense consensus through cross-party consultations, public information transparency, and enhanced social education.

On the other hand, open and diverse social structures are also crucial assets for defense resilience. The innovation and flexibility of democratic societies often stem from the collision of diverse viewpoints and the stimulation of academic freedom. Walker mentioned that by encouraging private-sector technological innovation, academic research, and cross-sectoral cooperation, new defense technologies and strategies can be rapidly generated to provide timely information and support during crises. Furthermore, the participation of civil organizations and communities can enable rapid response and rescue operations in emergency situations, thereby complementing the shortcomings of official institutions.

For Taiwan, Walker's perspective holds particularly instructive significance. Situated in a challenging geopolitical environment, the threats Taiwan faces are highly similar to the aforementioned international trends. To enhance defense resilience, aside from reinforcing military equipment and tactical training, Taiwan must also exert efforts in information security, social governance, and public participation. The government can reduce internal division and fully leverage the innovative potential of Taiwan's diverse society by strengthening cyber defenses, enhancing public information transparency, and promoting cross-party national defense consultations. If efforts can be simultaneously advanced across these fronts, Taiwan will be better positioned to confront the diversified threats posed by authoritarian nations.