Evaluating the Control Yuan's Demolition Debate: Balancing Oversight Efficacy and Political Risks

The Constitution Review Committee of the Legislative Yuan held a public hearing on the 21st, focusing on the transfer of supervisory powers following the proposed abolition of the Control Yuan. During the session, legislators from various political parties, Executive Yuan officials, and academic experts exchanged views. The committee also invited Assistant Professor Chiu Chao-lung from the Department of Public Affairs and Civic Education at Changhua University of Education to deliver a keynote address. The hearing centered on evaluating whether the original supervisory efficacy could be maintained if the Control Yuan’s functions were split, and it explored the impact of the new structure on political neutrality and administrative efficiency.

Since 2018, the Control Yuan has integrated the Judicial Investigation Bureau and the National Audit Office to form a “National Supervisory Committee” mechanism. This body is responsible for investigating corruption among public officials, administrative improprieties, and conducting financial audits. This mechanism is regarded as Taiwan’s institutionalized “third supervisory” force, capable of conducting independent investigations into governments at all levels and public institutions without being directly subordinate to the Executive Yuan. Its original intent was to fill the supervisory gap between the executive and judicial branches, thereby enhancing government transparency and accountability.

However, the proposal by the Constitution Review Committee to abolish the Control Yuan aims to distribute its supervisory functions among various departments or establish new institutions, with the goal of reducing administrative tiers and enhancing institutional flexibility. Supporters argue that the Control Yuan’s scale and organizational structure have become overly cumbersome, with some functions overlapping, and that splitting its duties would result in a more streamlined and professional system. Conversely, opponents fear that transferring supervisory powers to the legislative body or executive branch, which are controlled by the majority party, would undermine the independence and objectivity of oversight, potentially turning it into a political tool.

In his remarks, Assistant Professor Chiu pointed out that if the supervisors are politicized after the abolition of the Control Yuan, they will find it difficult to resist the majority party’s control over investigative resources. His concerns include the possibility that the majority in the legislature could directly determine the scope and priorities of investigations, leading to a bias toward political opponents or the neglect of vulnerable groups. He also warned that audit agencies might be forced to yield to administrative demands, losing their independent review of financial transparency, and that human rights bodies, lacking independent oversight, might fail to provide an effective check on administrative encroachments. Professor Chiu urged that if supervisory functions are to be split, legislation must clearly define the independence, resource guarantees, and procedural transparency of the supervisory institutions to prevent the politicization of oversight powers.

The discussions at this public hearing concern not only the organizational structure of the supervisory mechanism but also touch upon the core of Taiwan’s democratic system: checks and balances and the separation of powers. If supervisory functions are overly concentrated in a single political force, it may weaken the self-discipline mechanisms of administrative bodies, further increasing the risk of abuse of power. Conversely, if strict independent guarantees are established after the split, it is hoped that administrative efficiency can be improved while retaining the function of oversight, thereby maintaining government transparency and public trust. The future constitutional amendment process will depend on how various political parties balance efficiency with democratic safeguards.

The outcome of this public hearing will have a profound impact on Taiwan’s future supervisory system. If independent, transparent, and well-resourced supervisory institutions can be established after the split, it may offer new insights into Taiwan’s governance model. However, if regulations are not properly formulated, the supervisory functions may lose their original balancing effect, causing a negative impact on the democratic system. This issue is still in the legislative discussion stage, and all parties need to continue paying attention to ensure that the supervisory mechanism is not politicized, thereby maintaining the long-term stability of Taiwan’s democratic governance. (Source: Central News Agency)